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1 Introduction: pitfalls in the municipal reform debate1 
It was the chiefs who started local councils long beforelocal government (sic) took 
over. I feel that if chiefsare not there the local council is of no importance2 
In July 2016, the chiefs of Kumasi Traditional Council (KTC) gave an ultimatum demanding 
removal of then mayor of Kumasi, Kojo Bonsu.3 Commentary on the impasse was largely confined 
to existing tensions between mayoral leadership style and neo-traditional normative 
                                                 
1 I am grateful for insightful comments by Dieter Neubert and Peter K. Acheampong. An earlier version of the paper was 
presented in November 2017 at the ASA conference in Chicago, USA. I thank Kevin Fridy and Justin Williams for a fruitful 
discussion. 
2 A hint from a prominent chief (Dunn / Robertson 1973: 294). 
3 See Freiku and Alhassan (2016). Some interviewees argued that the mayor was ousted for being arrogant. On-site 
observation shows that his attempts to exclude the chiefs cost him his job. 
2  University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 22 
expectations. A change in mayoral leadership was hurriedly offered as solution to the deadlock in 
local governance. A careful examination reveals, however, that the chiefs were reacting to some 
deep-seated resentment of the local bureaucracy that has largely diminished their political 
influence since the colonial period. From a typical Weberian sense, one would be startled to find 
unelected actors with ‘customary-moral legitimacy’ dictate to state officials. Although different 
contexts generate their own experience of state and bureaucracy on a daily basis (Migdal / 
Schlichte: 2005), the Weberian model paradoxically remains the ‘default’ standard for evaluating 
local bureaucracies by public officials based on idealized notions of local democracy as promoted 
by international organizations. As an alternative, then opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
promised to elect mayors to help address such impasse in municipalities (see NPP 2016: 141). 
Thus, the tension over local authority was reduced to formal and meritocratic arguments that 
municipal reforms would simply resolve. 
Surprisingly, there is limited scholarly interest in how chieftaincy affects the everyday life of 
municipal councils and in the delivery of local services.4 With the state largely absent in much of 
the countryside, marginal actors fill the gap in public authority (Neubert 2009). Hence, the need 
to analyze how that ambiguity affects everyday municipal administration as these multiple 
institutions compete and cooperate to deliver local policy. And among institutions that compete 
and cooperate with the state to administer public authority (Lund 2006: 685; Ray 1996: 185), 
chieftaincy stands out. Ghanaian chiefs’ influence on municipalities, as regards executive power 
and development aspirations, remains significant (Ray 2003; Valsecchi 2008). 
Yet, the chieftaincy institution has been revered and vilified in the general life of local councils.5 
Indirect rule under colonial administration and programs of successive administrations largely 
took away the power and authority wielded by chiefs (Arhin 1985: 108; Rathbone 2000: 11). Even 
then, numerous legislations targeting chiefs and their associates did not deter them from 
maneuvering the local political project; they still influence the councils in clandestine and overt 
forms. This begs the questions: what specific functions do chiefs perform in the idealized versions 
of modern local administration? Why do chiefs’ influence on local councils persist despite the 
ostensible political programs that try to get them out? Can municipal councils produce public 
authority without chieftain support? Why do state officials persistently present the contrary by 
making claims of an idealized municipal bureaucracy that does not exist? Hardly have these 
concerns been articulated by extant explanations on the state and its lower tiers of administration. 
A helpful approach is to explore chiefs’ quotidian construction and negotiation of their relevance 
in local councils even if such legitimacy is frequently questioned by the state. 
Interest of elite politicians is fundamental to the present perspective and although scholars 
implicitly acknowledge this ‘chiefs-state legitimacy’ tactic inside municipal councils (see e.g. Ayee 
2012; Lentz 1998; Ray 1996), they fail to coherently articulate how such interest persists in 
                                                 
4 Ray (2003) discusses the topic and offers probable options to involve chiefs in municipal administration. How chiefs 
interact with the everyday life of municipal councils and practical outcomes remains less articulated. 
5 I use local councils to generically refer to councils designated as: District; Municipal; Urban; Town; and Area Councils 
set up by the different regimes to administer local government. 
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everyday projects of local councils. Beyond the dominant notion that sees local bureaucratic 
reform as a set of uncontested and uninterrupted projects and rules, one would uncover, from 
specific historical contexts, how actors’ interests and preferences shape and entrench the very 
institutions they publicly claim to change. I argue that while publicly using political programs to 
alienate chiefs, state actors at once are interested in their own political survival. Hence, they 
combine a mix of subtle strategies that enhance the resolve of chiefs to hold on to their narratives 
of being fundamental to local councils. Yet, chieftaincy maneuvers in the headship and task of local 
councils gravely shape the already fraught councils in delivering local public services (Sabbi 
2015). While the two institutions make different claims to legitimacy (see Ray 1996), in practice, 
state officials view their own claim to legitimacy as contingent on chiefs’ affirmation. This 
eventually leads to ambivalence in proposals for reform and everyday running of the councils. 
This paper explores the general ambivalence of five civilian regimes towards the chieftaincy 
institution namely: the colonial and four independent governments. These administrations 
evolved coherent political programs for the chieftaincy institution.6 The paper draws mainly on 
fieldwork conducted in municipalities of Kumasi and Wa7 in south-central and north-western 
Ghana respectively. Chiefs’ influence in these localities vary greatly and allows us to evaluate how 
chiefs and their preferences affect the everyday administration of local councils. Interviews with 
local politicians and bureaucrats supplemented archival data from the archives department in 
Kumasi, Ghana8 providing insights into local councils from colonial and immediate post-colonial 
eras. Accessible scholarly studies and newspaper articles related to the study augmented these 
strands of data. From a quotidian perspective in particular, the utterances and writings of leaders 
of the different administrations allow us to shed lights on how varying notions of municipal 
reforms vis-à-vis chieftaincy have been pursued to this day. Reflections on context and everyday 
courtesy accorded chiefs in these local councils highlight the ambiguity and discrepancy between 
talk and action on bureaucracy-oriented reforms within the councils.  
2 Local councils and public authority 
The idea that local political institutions enhance development compared to centrally-determined 
priorities dates back to the colonial period. Local councils were largely seen as the medium 
through which local priorities are evolved. Consequently, all post-colonial governments offered 
varying visions of this ideal although the most ambitious was the decentralization program in the 
1980s. One central feature in these programs was the status of chiefs inside and outside of local 
councils. While some regimes tried to strip chiefs of their powers and get them out of politics, 
others broadened their powers in local political decisions. The composition of the current 
municipal councils must be summarized: Ghanaian municipal governments, known locally as the 
                                                 
6 The military governments did not evolve any coherent local political programs. 
7 Fieldwork conducted in the municipal councils in 2013 and 2014. In 2017, seven municipalities were added from 
which insights are drawn. 
8 Formally, the Public Records and Archives Department (PRAAD) in Kumasi. 
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District Assemblies (DAs), has a mixed representation. 70% of members are directly elected on a 
‘no-party’ platform while the national government appoints the remaining 30% and ultimately 
the mayor who heads the executive. Again, in large cities 30% of members on the second-tier 
council, Sub-Metropolitan District Councils (SMDCs) are appointed by the national government. 
Starting from the 1980s, chiefs hold (only) consultative and advisory roles in local councils. The 
puzzle, however, is that these pieces of legislation rarely restrain chiefs from dictating the course 
of action in local councils. This behavior of chiefs would appear to defy the conventional logic of 
bureaucracy and administration, at least from the Weberian perspective. However, the critique 
does not apply in all contexts since public authority is co-produced with actors both inside and 
outside of administration (Lund 2006). In fact, chiefs straddle both spheres of authority. In fact, 
there is a more formalized system for chiefs in Ghana compared with most African states where 
chiefs have either only a ceremonial role or they are outside the formal political system. State-
sanctioned and recognized institutions of chieftaincy include the ministry for chieftaincy, national 
and regional houses of chiefs and the numerous traditional councils.  
2.1 Chieftaincy and communal authority  
Let me begin with a short description of what might be read as the official task for Ghanaian chiefs. 
In contrast to other African states, Ghanaian chiefs enjoy a privileged status in the formal political 
system. Chiefs are generally considered as trustees of customary law, land and property. Apart 
from preserving the identity, norms and values of cultural groups, their courts settle mundane 
disputes that are deemed fit for customary law. In particular litigations over land, customary 
inheritance, and marriage disputes are handled by chiefs. In terms of local public policy, which is 
their most potent narrative for legitimacy, chiefs are very active in communal mobilization for 
service delivery in a self-organized fashion. They bring together youth groups to fulfill public 
services that the state is unable to deliver. Chiefs often occupy their position based on claims of 
descent to a particular ancestor of a royal house that sets them apart from nobles and non-royals. 
Still, the nomenclature of Ghanaian chieftaincy is complex ranging from Paramount, Divisional, 
and Sub-divisional chiefs through to lower chiefs in small towns and villages (so-called Adikro) 
(Republic of Ghana 2008). This complexity prompts two issues. The first is a problem with 
definition; chiefs differ not only in their authority but also their personal background and the 
resource endowments for which they are trustees. In some quarters, chiefs with enormous natural 
resources and large followers are designated ‘kings’ while those with fewer resources become 
‘ordinary’ chiefs. Hence, chiefs cannot be seen as a monolithic category with interest in local 
politics. Despite resource endowments, there is an apparent trend of chiefs’ interest in municipal 
councils in Ghana. Therefore, the term chief is used generically to describe and analyze the interest 
of neo-traditional actors in municipal politics. Second, the complexity also highlights the different 
motives underpinning chiefs’ interest in contemporary local politics. Although some chiefs engage 
the political arena in a passive way, others use the space to jumpstart their career in national 
politics (Lentz 1998: 55).  
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Overall, chiefs interested in local politics—either as a launch-pad for political advancement or 
terminating at the town-village level—could occupy leadership positions. What is more striking 
is that although their membership in local councils are based mostly on nominations instead of 
popular elections, neo-traditional actors permeate the top echelons of local administration. One 
councilor recounted at one point their “Presiding Member [PM] was a chief” although he was 
unpopular9 because “he did not know the concept of the Assembly and subsequently lost re-
elections after two years [to his predecessor].” (Councilor, Kumasi, 02.10.2013).10 The chiefs 
themselves decide who represents their seats on the local councils. For one councilor, they  
can contact the paramount chief [that] we need a chief for this session [but] it is not the council 
that specifically selects chiefs’ representatives; that is in the domain of chiefs themselves to pick 
(Councilor, Wa, 31.07.2013). 
Again, it should be pointed out that neo-traditional actors enjoy enviable influence within the 
councils. There is an oft-cited position that chiefs and their institutions have lost their relevance 
in contemporary political projects but that point ignores the ambiguity that shrouds the role of 
chiefs in local policy-making. That ambiguous role does not assuage chiefs’ influence on local 
political decisions. One bureaucrat hinted that  
it is because [chiefs] are down there with the people and they also serve as miniature 
court; they handle cases [so] when you’re doing any activity, e.g. Farmer’s Day, you go 
looking for the paramount chief for the area (Senior administrator, Kumasi, 
28.07.2014). 
Thus, chiefs help co-provide public authority given the gap left by the state’s apparent absence in 
communal areas. Nevertheless, the question of why chiefs’ interest in local councils persist despite 
being a target of reforms remains. A closer look at the interests of chiefs in the councils can shed 
some light on legitimacy preoccupation of actors both inside and outside of local councils. 
2.2 Contingent legitimacy: chieftains and the ‘hypocrisy’ of municipal reforms 
The tactics of Ghanaian regimes to chieftaincy in local politics vis-à-vis local responses from chiefs 
reflect a credibility dilemma that is mutually contingent for both actors. This dilemma, with its 
roots in the colonial apparatus, is what I term contingent legitimacy.11 Persistent efforts to rid 
chiefs from local councils have been made through local council reform. Therefore, I outline an 
institutional explanation for reforms and everyday resilience of chiefs and the maintenance of the 
status quo in Ghanaian municipalities. Sociologically, institutions are interactive meanings that 
emerge, not so much from availability of incentives or some legal structures, but rather from some 
                                                 
9 Despite accusations of being manipulated by the executive, it was remarkable that chiefs would lead local councils. 
10 The PM chairs full meetings of the municipal council. 
11 The notion of contingent legitimacy is a useful and more open approach that helps to link local political practices as 
a response to the global project of modern administration, diffused from nineteenth-century Europe via colonial and 
immediate post-colonial eras (Kühl 2015: 262f.; Meyer 1992).  
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societal consensus that gives legitimacy. They are accepted, by a collective, as appropriate and 
deserve obedience on a quotidian basis (see Habermas 1989; Luhmann 1986; Suchman 1995). 
This quotidian quality of institutions makes them resilient even in the face of concerted attempts 
by other legitimate institutions to modify them. Chieftaincy is one channel through which we can 
explore processes of institutional persistence in spite of concerted reform efforts. State actors, in 
order to appear credible, forcefully and publicly articulate a commitment to initiate change from 
the perspective of a responsive, ‘modern’ bureaucracy that excludes any remit from actors on the 
margins of the state. Such attempts are instrumental for the state’s desired legitimacy.  
Meanwhile, there is little discussion on how influential chiefs react to such attempts in the local 
arena. And a caveat for the few extant studies is that there are disciplinary polemics on the subject 
of chieftaincy. Neubert argues that “anthropologists tend to be fascinated by these institutions and 
often argue in favor of them” while “political scientists are mostly more skeptical and take them 
as an indicator of problems of state building”. The challenge with these sympathetic feelings from 
both camps is that it “may inhibit a more detailed risk analysis of the relationship between the 
state and the local institutions” (Neubert 2009: 43f.). Unsurprisingly, a section of the literature 
proposes inclusion of chiefs in current projects of local democracy because their social norms and 
sanctions inherently produced both responsiveness and accountability in local service delivery 
(see Blundo 2015: 145; Kelsall 2011: 234-239; Owusu-Sarpong 2003: 54).12 Nonetheless, critics 
believe chiefs instrumentally use such claims to strengthen their political power and create 
hierarchies that defeat the notion of accountability (see e.g. Grischow 2008: 87f.). Since these 
attributes are among the many deficits of local democracy and service delivery in much of sub-
Saharan Africa, the arguments receive much attention. 
Regarding local policy, the precolonial era witnessed a sort of proto-local government 
arrangement in which chiefs and their institutions administered a whole gamut of executive and 
military portfolios including local taxation, land and royalties. This arrangement was 
fundamentally altered with the advent of colonial indirect rule that subsequently established 
native and local councils. This new arrangement ushered in an established practice that chiefs and 
their associates could either serve on these councils or delegate their candidates of interest. 
Conventionally, one may expect such institutional practices that loosely emerge to disappear 
especially when the conditions and incentives that established them are not tenable. However, 
this is often not the case even if the very reasons that established them no longer exist. Fact is, 
once established these interests remain linked to subsequent institutional arrangements. They 
may even become structures for resisting new institutions and their reform. These interests could 
be covert and subtle, operating from the fringes of formal institutions reflecting so-called “twilight 
institutions” (Lund 2006: 686). At the same time, they may be expressed overtly such as direct 
involvement of chiefs in local councils or the creation of parallel institutions and practices.  
                                                 
12 One should bear in mind that the institution of chieftaincy itself fosters elements of corruption since positions are not 
fixed and chiefs at any specific instance, have more room to allocate communal resources and privileges to their 
preferred allies in order to curry loyalty or to diffuse dissent (see Berry 1998).  
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Therefore, a conventional logic that frames Ghanaian municipalities as explicitly formal 
bureaucratic structures based solely on state legitimacy and treats neo-traditional interest as an 
‘outlier’, disguises the institutional remit of chieftaincy in municipal politics. Within the existing 
local councils, chiefs appear to offer legitimacy to municipal programs and they forcefully dictate 
the tone for public forums and other social events of municipal councils (see appendix). 
Meanwhile, chiefs are not the only actors with interest in the local political arena. There are 
regular politicians whose own political fortunes depend on chiefs and customary loyalty. Despite 
their divided legitimacy (Ray 1996), the state and chieftaincy “are in reality mutually constituting” 
(Lentz / Nugent 2000: 16), a practical arrangement that I refer to as ‘contingent legitimacy’.13 
Despite their competing claims over the wielder of local legitimacy, the state and chieftaincy 
practically depend on each other to generate the necessary cultural endorsement that appeals to 
their constituencies regarding the delivery of public authority and local services. More significant, 
in the absence of well-functioning state bureaucracies in the Weberian sense, a gap in public 
authority is created and the state wittingly or unwittingly defers much of its functions to actors 
on the margins, notably chiefs. The everyday life of municipal councils entails compromises and 
accommodation with chieftaincy so that basic public services and order are delivered. This tacit 
arrangement goes beyond the confines of explicit norms to non-formal but practical mix of social 
and professional norms that complement, divert and subvert explicit norms (see Blundo 2015: 
143; Cleaver 2015: 208).  
In light of these contingent alliances, crafty comprises and accommodations, the covert political 
interest of chiefs is reified, leading to a major complexity for the municipal arrangements. Reforms 
of moribund institutions of local councils are captured by chiefs and used to preserve existing 
practices. With their roles ambiguously defined, chiefs and their associates conveniently influence 
local councils and ensure their preferred candidates take up headship positions to address their 
interests. Thus, analysis of specific institutional practices and their persistence must consider how 
such practices have historically evolved. With their wealth of influence that transcend local 
politics, chiefs craftily adapt to realignments in the councils. 
3 Alternating resilience: chieftaincy and local legitimacy trajectories 
Although there have been concerted efforts by specific regimes to rid chiefs of their political 
influence, their institution has undoubtedly remained resilient. The relationship between the 
different administrations and chieftaincy may be fruitfully appreciated when put in the proper 
historical contexts. That the state’s own legitimacy depended on chieftaincy is illustrated by 
national political programs designed for local councils as shown in Table 1.  
                                                 
13 Lund’s (2006) concept of twilight institution refers also to the fact that chiefs gain part of their legitimacy through 
the state that accepts their role either formally or by informal recognition by offering some sort of respect. The concept 
of “contingent legitimacy” elaborates this idea further by highlighting the mutual legitimization of both the state and 
chieftaincy institution. 
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3.1 Colonial bureaucracy and the remit of chiefs 
Despite their nibbling resistance to indirect rule, chiefs were the ‘go-between’ actors straddling 
the local population and the colonial administration. Local government was administered through 
chiefship patronage. When indirect rule assumed the narrative for local development, chiefs 
quickly adapted their ‘go-between’ role into development brokers—brokering deals with colonial 
officials on behalf of their subjects (Bierschenk et al. 2002: 12; Neubert 1996: 2). 
Table 1. Key legislation and their object for chieftaincy and local councils. Source: Author’s 
compilation based on Ahwoi (2010) and Thomi (1999) 
Regime Legislation Year Object Implication 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l A
d
m
in
istra
tio
n
 
Municipal Councils 
Ordinances 
1859 Coastal 
Municipalities 
create 
Partly elected 
members with 
appointee chiefs 
Native Jurisdiction 
Ordinances 
1878 / 
1883 
Paramount and 
division chiefs 
recognized 
Chiefs make byelaws 
and adjudicate civil 
and criminal cases 
Native Administration 
Ordinances 
1927 State councils as 
highest authority 
Chiefs consolidate 
local political power 
Native Treasuries 
Ordinances 
1936 / 
1939 
State Councils 
impose levies and 
keep records  
Chiefs could levy and 
spend locally 
Native Authority 
Ordinance 
1944 Separation: State 
Council 
(customary); Native 
Auth. (regime) 
Native Authorities 
challenge chiefs’ 
levying competence  
E
le
ct. A
sse
m
b
ly
 
Local Government 
Ordinance 
1951 Chiefs preside over 
local councils. New 
councils created 
Regime recognition of 
chiefs in local councils 
Municipal Councils 
Ordinance 
1953 Urban councils 
created. Markedly 
different from local 
councils  
Led by educated 
urban Africans. Chiefs 
limited to local 
councils 
P
o
st-C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
D
e
m
o
cra
tic 
A
d
m
in
istra
tio
n
s 
Local Government Act 1961 Redefines 
membership of local 
councils   
Restricts chiefs’ 
influence in local 
councils 
Chieftaincy Act  
[Act 81] 
1964 Redefines 
chieftaincy and 
mode of recognition   
Multiple routes to 
chiefship. ‘Compliant 
chiefs’ on local 
councils 
Local Administration Act  
[Act 359] 
1971 Redefines 
chieftaincy in local 
Chiefs could head 
local councils 
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councils. Half the 
members are Chiefs 
Chieftaincy Act  
[Act 370] 
1971 Redefines 
chieftaincy based on 
customary law   
Primacy of chiefs in 
local councils. Regime 
funds chieftaincy 
Local Government Act  
[Act 462] 
1993 Reforms local 
councils and defines 
new roles   
Consultative and 
appointive roles for 
chiefs 
Chieftaincy Act  
[Act 759] 
2008 Re-aligns chiefs’ 
primacy to 
Constitution    
Chiefs with own funds, 
could undermine 
authority of local 
councils   
However, their specific role and relationship with the colonial administration soon became 
ambiguous. This was marked especially when local government became the official platform for 
development preferred by the colonial government.14 Impliedly, local political leadership became 
formalized—a development that alarmed non-literate chiefs. They feared that leadership and 
decision-making roles would end up in the hands of non-royals. At the same time, indirect rule 
and local political programs pursued by the colonial administration created leeway for chiefs to 
circumvent local government arrangements. Fact is, the colonial administration vaguely pursued 
local government that allowed them to divide and rule the interior (Dunn / Robertson 1973: 86) 
without any commitment to develop robust institutions for administration. The chiefs would then 
manipulate the vague rules of local administration. That was marked in the Northern Territories,15 
where the colonial administration structured local councils to by-pass the almost immutable 
position of chiefs by promoting literate chiefs and commoners into position of authority 
(Grischow 2006: 170). In response, chiefs and their associates craftily devised ways to offset the 
new rules. They promoted educated princes while those with royal connections were elected or 
appointed to local councils in order to serve the chiefs’ interest. Educated nobles in southern 
Ghana were enticed to abandon their posts and take up local government appointments in the 
north (Staniland 1975: 117ff.). 
It should, however, be noted that attempts by the colonial administration to short-change chiefs 
in favor of elected representatives and educated commoners was a program that appeared 
feasible mainly with local councils in northern Ghana for two reasons. First, chiefs in north did not 
pose serious threats to the administration compared with their counterparts in the south. Second, 
educated commoners were the targets for jobs in those local councils so that unemployment did 
not become an avenue for dissent against the administration. This divide and rule tactic was 
apparent in a 1954 legislation that specified the membership of chiefs on local councils: 
                                                 
14 Indirect rule was rationalized into a local, self-organized, development project, which required intermediaries and 
chiefs were ideal brokers. Later, when local government became the new agenda, the relevance of chiefs waned (see 
Grischow 2006: 170). 
15 Comprising today’s Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions 
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The principle shall be observed that one-third of the membership of local government 
councils shall be reserved for persons appointed by traditional councils. In the 
Northern Territories, departures from this ratio may be permitted by the Minister of 
Local Government (Asafu-Adjaye 1951. Folder No. ARG2/11/1/1). 
Thus, the colonial administration sought to capitalize on the weakness of northern chiefs to 
further erode their authority in order to contain probable dissent from educated Africans who 
were looking for jobs. One may infer that the colonial administration capitalized on the presence 
of so-called chiefless societies, or strategically ignored elites inside such groups, and used the local 
councils to contain popular dissent. Even for southern chiefs, joining the councils entailed giving 
up their royalty, which was always an uphill task. For that reason, delegating this role to non-
chiefs might have appeared reasonable. The regulation stated that: 
persons appointed by traditional authority shall not necessarily be members of the 
traditional body, but in the Colony and Ashanti, they shall exclude paramount chiefs … 
Where a chief is appointed to a local authority by a traditional council, he shall, on 
ceasing to be a chief, relinquish his seat upon the local authority but will be eligible 
for re-election (Asafu-Adjaye 1951. Folder No. ARG2/11/1/1). 
With the intent to curtail southern chiefs’ authority, the administration systematically and 
persistently pursued projects to get rid of chiefs from local councils. Most of these chiefs had to 
constantly strike a delicate balance between abstaining from local politics, giving up their royal 
privileges or delegating individuals to represent their interests. None of those possibilities could 
be taken lightly by the traditional authorities. 
The persisting interest of chiefs in local councils stems from the strategy of the colonial 
administration. The inclusion of chiefs in local councils was not to develop some ‘modern’ form of 
participatory local political structure per se. Instead, their inclusion was implicitly used to quell 
any resistance that chiefs posed to the colonial government. Put bluntly, it was a technique for 
“dividing and ruling” the local people (Dunn / Robertson 1973: 86). This tactic manifested in the 
different legislation for municipal councils (Municipal Council Ordinance of 1953) and native 
ordinances for rural areas (Local Government Ordinance of 1951) particularly and (see Ahwoi 
2010: 9–14). This tactic allowed the administration to manipulate, in particular, village-level 
councils dominated by chiefs. Despite colonial bureaucrats’ privileged status, they appeared 
indifferent to local government since their operations were based on individual preferences16 and 
focused on the maintenance of the colonial apparatus. After all, their vision of local development 
was not linked to any particular local political project. As Hyam (2010: 224) points out, 
development at the time was more or less an attempt to fight disease and build physical projects 
                                                 
16 They came from elite universities with rich experience in military, surveying, road construction, law, and rudimentary 
medicine (Kirk-Greene 2000: 136–146) but were no specialist in the field of local administration. Rathbone’s (2000: 
11) designation of these actors as a bunch of “confused colonial bureaucrats” who oversaw local government is very 
apt. 
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such as roads and railways without any coherent local political program.17 In general as 
Fieldhouse highlights, the colonial project was “a particular, largely unplanned and … transient 
phase” in the contact between the colonizers and territories that were colonized (1981: 49).  
Once chiefs had adapted to tactics of the colonial administration, it was less surprising that they 
resented proposals for local political reforms after independence. At the time, a new political 
arrangement involving popular representation was mooted to replace the existing arrangement 
of delegation. Naturally, the chiefs took no interests at all in the promises touted by the changes. 
Dunn and Robertson (1973: 298) explain that the chiefs preferred appointees come to consult 
them and take their interest to the councils. Nonetheless, we also find that chiefs were resenting 
the colonial and post-colonial arrangement that created a hierarchy above them. They always 
wanted to run the councils and administer public order. After all, chieftaincy was largely a local 
representative political arrangement. 
3.2 Anti-chieftaincy maneuvers of Kwame Nkrumah’s administration  
That the independent state of Nkrumah pursued a somewhat aggressive program of local 
governance that envisaged the Weberian model, at least in intent, is not surprising. Even before 
independence, the actions and demands of councilors were under scrutiny with an unequivocal 
reference to the British model. The Local Government Minister in 1952 emphatically cautioned 
councilors’ demand for better remuneration with reference to the British model: 
I regard it as fundamental that members of local government bodies should not 
receive any payment, other than the repayment of out-of-pocket expenses, for their 
“part-time” services on the council … In Britain, the concept that local government is 
a proper field for voluntary service, rather than a profession … has produced a class 
of councillors who, by reason of looking to the ideal of service rather than of personal 
gain, have proved themselves to be fit and worthy representatives of the communities 
which they serve (Asafu-Adjaye 1952. Folder No. ARG2/11/1/5). 
With Nkrumah’s blatant distrust for chiefs, that caution very pointedly threatened the perquisites 
the latter enjoyed on the councils. His rhetoric that chiefs would one day “run away fast and leave 
their sandals behind them” (Nkrumah, 5 January 1950) was also systematically implemented. In 
fact, Nkrumah’s program anticipated fewer chiefs and their influence in local councils. This 
objective was evident in flattery comments by one official on the exclusion of chiefs from new local 
councils in 1958: 
The instrument makes no provision for traditional membership on the new councils. 
I understand that it is Government’s wish that these members be eliminated from the 
local councils. There are additional reasons against including such a representative 
                                                 
17 The notion that modern bureaucracy is a “happy accident” of the colonial apparatus in Africa (Anyaoku 2007: 19; cf. 
De Jaun / Pierskalla 2017: 162) rarely holds because rigorous institutions were not pursued.  
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(i) that if only 1 [one] representative is included, the councillors would be an even 
number making it possible for an even decision to occur and (ii) that it would be very 
difficult to decide how one representative would be elected by the various traditional 
authorities represented within the council’s area (Townsend 1958. Folder No. 
ARG2/11/1/12). 
Despite attempts to rationalize exclusion of chiefs, the intent was evidently clear that chiefs were 
a nuisance to formal bureaucratic and policy processes. Municipal reforms in 1961 (see Act 54) 
allowed Nkrumah to dissolve several councils on grounds of corruption but that was clearly a 
pretense to rid non-compliant chiefs of political influence. That explains why the regime’s 
programs of “creating larger local government units” by sometimes joining old ones was “hotly 
contested by many chiefs who stood to lose even more authority” (Rathbone 2000: 135). 
Chieftaincy corruption was often invoked as a cover for the regime’s fear of losing its legitimacy. 
With the reorganizations of the councils, Austin (1970: 260) notes that chiefs and their 
institutions: 
were pushed aside to make way for the new local authorities with their two-thirds 
elected membership. Government subsidies were still paid to the chiefs...but the 
substance of their power, including the levying of the local rate, passed to the new 
urban and local councils. The future looked still more bleak, for the views of the CPP 
were well known, and their refusal in 1953–4 to recommend the establishment of a 
second chamber confirmed the chiefs’ forebodings. 
Nkrumah certainly continued the colonial project of divide and rule and the ambivalence became 
clearer when he at once created and elevated paramount chiefs by side-stepping existing 
customary arrangements, and prohibiting ‘troublesome’ chiefs from local councils. This approach 
was seen as broadly enhancing the socio-economic standing of non-royal elites (Thomi 1999: 104) 
but it was resisted especially in parts of southern Ghana, where his Convention Peoples Party 
(CPP) was disparaged and hated.18 Only an aggressive policy of destoolment and detention could 
subdue the chiefs. Quite surprising was the marked deviation from the norm, by promoting 
educated and loyal commoners onto the local councils. Nkrumah tactically used legislation to 
appoint his protégés and sympathizers to replace chiefs who opposed the regime. In one rare 
instance, Nkrumah elevated a woman as paramount chief (Figure 1 shows a pose of Nkrumah and 
Dwaben Serwaa, presumably the female paramount chief) because she “was also a staunch CPP 
supporter” which generated criticism and protesters from youths “who argued that it was ‘in 
flagrant violation of custom’” (Rathbone 2000: 144).19 Unsurprisingly, sympathizers and 
administrators managed to convince the youth to withdraw their protest. Again, Nkrumah altered 
extant chieftaincy arrangements in northern Ghana by elevating leaders of hitherto ‘acephalous’ 
                                                 
18 The opposition fruitfully linked existing family and chieftaincy disputes to their political project to resist the regime 
(Rathbone 2000: 92–97). 
19 Presumably, this was the famous Dwaben Serwaa II. I thank Peter. K. Acheampong for drawing my attention to this 
event. 
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societies to paramount chiefs in order to sway their support and votes in his favor (Lund 2003: 
593).  
Figure 1: Nkrumah and his wife in a pose with Dwaben Serwaa c.a. late 1950s. © New 
Juaben Akwantukese 2012. 
 
The cherry-picking tactic by Nkrumah affected the everyday life of the councils. In Ashanti where 
he pointedly tried to curb the power of chiefs, his officials at once sought to promote ‘obedient’ 
chiefs to top echelons of new councils. One official pointed out in 1958: 
I recommend that only Paramount Chiefs in the area of each council may be appointed 
presidents of the council and provision has accordingly been made in the draft 
Instruments (Government Agent 1958. Folder No. ARG2/11/1/4).  
Particularly striking, Nkrumah’s administration defined a chief as: “an individual who has been 
nominated, elected and installed as a chief in accordance with customary law, or as a person 
recognized by the minister responsible for local government” (Act 81, Art. 1: 1). Impliedly, 
Nkrumah could afford to appoint, recognize and depose a person without customary approval, to 
represent his interest especially on the councils. That may explain why he went ahead to appoint 
a woman as paramount chief in striking violation of customary arrangements. One could surmise 
that Nkrumah’s interest in delegitimizing powerful chiefs cost him a great deal, as his own source 
of legitimacy from the state and his preferred cronies was not enough to overcome the resolve of 
powerful chiefs that contributed to his overthrow.  
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3.3 Bringing the chiefs back in? Kofi Busia’s pro-chieftaincy municipal project  
Perhaps due to ideological differences with Nkrumah and his own royal inclinations, Busia’s 
administration, from 1969 to 1972, brought the chiefs back into local administration. He was 
largely a man of the chiefs especially in Ashanti.20 Unlike Nkrumah and other elites who saw chiefs 
as anti-progressive, Busia variously asserted the democratic and resilience of chieftaincy (cf. Busia 
1968: 7–13; Busia 1971: 22–26). He went further to defend chiefs and their institutions against 
claims that they stood in the way of political change and development: 
the fact that each lineage, village, or part of chiefdom managed as much of its own 
affairs as was consistent with the unity of the whole chiefdom enabled many to share 
in decision-making in local affairs; for the head of each unit was, like the chief at the 
centre, obliged to act only on the concurrence and with the advice of his own council 
(Busia 1971: 24).  
it is resilient, as those who have tried to suppress it have discovered. For the majority 
of African communities, the kinship systems represent a secure sheet anchor in a sea 
of bewildering social change, and they cling to it with intense loyalty (Busia 1971: 36). 
Having bemoaned the shrinking influence of chiefs in local policy-making, Busia’s political 
tradition embraced chieftaincy as crucial for local transformation. This was done largely to curry 
favor with chiefs, who in return, legitimized his rule. His electoral fortune in Ashanti with powerful 
chiefs attests to that assertion. Nevertheless, Busia’s position was contradictory, having criticized 
the institution of chieftaincy as inherently corrupt (Busia 1968: 172, 200) all the while generating 
his own popular legitimacy from it. Thus, not only did Busia attack the anti-chieftaincy programs 
of his predecessors but also argued for preservation of chieftaincy in modern politics. Two pieces 
of legislation were useful for Busia’s projects: the Local Administration Act 359 of 1971, and the 
Chieftaincy Act 370 of 1971.21 These laws realigned chieftaincy with local administration, in 
contrast to Nkrumah’s tactics. To be sure, Busia openly embraced a trend where local politics 
would mix with kinship and chiefs’ loyalty, and in so doing brought his political legitimacy into 
the limelight (Busia 1971: 119; Danso-Boafo 1996: 27). This assertion is quite evident in Busia’s 
address to Bolgatanga chiefs in 1969: 
I would like to assure you, the chiefs, that under the constitution of the Second 
Republic, my Government is committed to the maintenance of the institution of 
chieftaincy and will encourage our chiefs to play an increasingly important role in 
national development as well as in local and regional affairs (Busia 1970: 27).  
Very remarkable is the fact that while Busia strongly favored chiefs in politics, they were only 
active in local- and village-level politics and largely cut-off from national political decisions 
                                                 
20 His academic writings heralded the invaluable role of chiefs in communal politics.  
21 This piece of legislation was quite fundamental that it remained in force until it was modified in 2008. 
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(Knierzinger 2011: 13). Thus, although Busia held pro-chieftaincy views, this strategy largely 
allowed him gain local and national legitimacy while constraining chiefs and their influence to 
communal politics. This attempt to extend his rural political base gave impetus to the 
comprehensive rural-biased development projects for which he is famously remembered (see 
Aryeetey / Goldstein 2000: 14). 
Taken together, the apparent contradictory visions of Nkrumah and Busia regarding chiefs in local 
politics is interesting for at least two reasons. True, they differed on the nature of local 
governance: centralized vis-à-vis decentralized councils with or without chiefs. Yet, not only were 
these competing political visions of two administrations but were strikingly similar as they sought 
to play and strengthen their political bases at the countryside. Neither of them was really 
committed to strengthening the local political system or its administration per se. Their main 
disagreement was over the means to get to their desired end. While Busia employed pro-
chieftaincy views, Nkrumah largely undercut ‘opposition’ chiefs towards the same goal. These 
competing perspectives have shaped political projects of contemporary administrations.22 In 
contrast to their proffered ideological and political projects namely African socialism versus 
liberal democracy (Agyeman 1988: 17)23, chieftaincy became a disguised and well-calculated idea 
to extend their ethno-political bases. These tactics were “were strategic, not dogmatic; rulers 
responded to threats and opportunities emanating from rural society” (Boone 2003: 175). They 
are used to generate popular legitimacy as regimes attempt to consolidate national political 
power.  
3.4. Chieftaincy and contemporary municipal politics 
Ghana’s democratic transition in 1992 held much promise and ushered in ambitious political 
programs. It promised to introduce modern local politics institutions that are accountable and 
responsive to the needs of local people. These institutions, the local councils, were to be robust 
and participatory for representatives and their electorates. Despite the many administrative 
reforms, the question and uncertainty surrounding chiefs in the councils were hardly confronted, 
perhaps as I argue, this was due to the mutual constitution of the state and chieftaincy for 
legitimacy. Therefore, the ambiguity to that question has remained resolute. 
                                                 
22 Hilla Limann’s short-lived administration (1979-81) followed largely the prevailing political tradition of Busia, which 
was pro-chieftaincy despite Limann’s ‘Nkrumahist’ claims. His Local Government (Amendment) Act 403 of 1980 did not 
fundamentally alter the one designed by Busia. 
23 Nkrumah’s African socialism in principle aimed to integrate indigenous political institutions into existing notions of 
socialism. Busia’s testimony at the US Senate hearing in 1962 did not only cast an image of him as liberal and western-
leaning but also made a mockery of Nkrumah’s African socialism ideals. Paradoxically in practice, Busia’s liberalism was 
anchored on conservative chieftaincy privileges while Nkrumah’s African socialism antagonized chieftaincy (see Is U.S. 
Money Aiding Another Communist State? 1962). 
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3.4.1 Rawlings’ NDC and chieftaincy ambivalence  
Rawlings’ National Democratic Congress (NDC) has its ideology of social democracy linked to the 
political project and tradition of Nkrumah. However, it held somewhat ambivalent and covert 
orientation towards chiefs in local councils compared with overt pro-chieftaincy rhetoric of the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP). Rawlings’ populist programs, prior to the 1992 democratic transition, 
were implicitly anti-chieftaincy, especially in politics. That became clearer when local councils in 
towns and villages were taken over by so-called Committee for the Defence of the Revolution 
(CDR) and the People’s Defence Committee (PDC). Members of these committees suspiciously 
viewed chieftaincy as an avenue for amassing private property, particularly in the cocoa 
producing areas, home to the most powerful chiefs in Ghana. In the early days of his so-called 
revolution, as Christian Kohrs notes, Rawlings perceived non-compliant chiefs as saboteurs of his 
political project. And although some chiefs were coaxed to join the PDCs, that was not enough to 
assuage the regime’s doubts of the logic of action of chiefs inside and outside of his committees: 
The reports of conflicts between chiefs and PDC’s (sic) reaching us indicate that some 
chiefs either do not understand the PDC idea or are opposed to it (Kohrs 2001: 112). 
This position was contradictory as his regime continued to enjoy the support of ‘friendly’ chiefs in 
some communal areas such as the Volta Region (Nugent 1996: 218; Ray 1996: 191). The 
ambivalence is quite vivid if one looks at how the legislation constituting local councils was 
framed in the NDC era. Indeed, the selection of non-elected members still remains the reserve of 
chiefs: 
any other persons not exceeding thirty percent of the total membership of the 
Assembly appointed by the President in consultation with the traditional authorities 
and any other interest groups in the district (Republic of Ghana 1993).  
Thus, while one legislation (the Constitution), somehow alienated chiefs from active political 
functions, chiefs nonetheless were empowered by another legislation in the everyday running of 
the local councils to select their protégés and help assert neo-traditional interests and preference. 
This reminds us of the observation that the chiefs prefer to send their protégés who would consult 
and do what they wished on the councils (Dunn / Robertson 1973: 298). That is in addition to 
their active service on key committees of the councils. Rawlings’ ambivalence with chiefs found 
expression in his apathy towards chieftaincy legislation. His administration maintained the 
existing legislation (Act 370) in apparent disguise of non-interference in chieftaincy affairs. Yet, 
the regime’s cloaking was obvious in 1996 when Rawlings began contemplating constitutional 
changes for chiefs to enter into party politics (Lentz 1998: 52). Rawlings’ contradictory position 
on chieftaincy emerged when he held that chiefs have to: 
retrieve and revive our simple cultural disciplines and values which have been 
weakened and even abandoned in the name of so-called modernism...At the same 
time, you must acknowledge progressive and positive ideas, be they local or foreign, 
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which will promote social and economic wellbeing of our people [through chieftaincy] 
as custodians of our cultural heritage and trustees of those qualities (Rawlings 1993).  
Despite close affinity with Nkrumah’s ideology, Rawlings’ chieftaincy tactics were largely 
ambiguous since he somehow reposed in chiefs a governance responsibility in local councils.24  
3.4.2 The pro-chieftains return: NPP administrations and local government 
When the NPP came to power in 2001, its approach to chiefs was rarely surprising given its 
support base in the Akan-speaking areas where chiefs wield enormous political influence. A case 
in point is the promise by the current Akufo-Addo administration to “strengthen the role of 
traditional authorities within the local government system” (NPP 2016: 142). This, bluntly put, is 
a continuation of old political traditions of the Dankwa-Busia-Dombo, a pro-chieftaincy political 
ideology,25 and founding pillar of the NPP. Former President Kufour numerously revered Busia’s 
writings on chieftaincy and the importance of that institution for contemporary Ghanaian politics 
(Knierzinger 2011: 13). He would go ahead to re-interpret the governing structure for chiefs. The 
Regional and National Houses of Chiefs, that keep a register, gazette chiefs and settle chieftaincy 
disputes, are seen by many as attempts to regulate and restrict the autonomy enjoyed by chiefs 
(Ray 1996: 189–192; Nugent 1998: 221–222). For Kufour however:  
the establishment of the Ministry [of Chieftaincy and Culture] should not be 
misconstrued as an act of interference in activities of traditional rulers…[the Ministry] 
was established to serve an effective link between Government and the National 
House of Chiefs in recognition of the important role traditional authorities played in 
the country’s development and you the traditional authorities (Kufour 2006, 30 
August 2006).  
To be sure, Kufour’s pro-chieftaincy strategy was much deeper and went farther than Busia’s. By 
2008, Kufour had sought to strengthen the role of chiefs and remove several inhibitions to their 
participation in national politics unlike Busia. The promulgation of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 
759) is very illustrative. After leaving office, Kufour made a clarion call for the establishment of a 
second chamber of parliament to be composed mainly by chiefs and other patrichal elites.26 
Considering the pro-chieftaincy views of the NPP, it is less striking that the current NPP 
administration has promised both continuity and break with chiefs on local councils, thus 
enhancing further the existing ambiguity. President Akufo-Addo reiterated his commitment to: 
work closely with chiefs across the country by consulting them in the appointment of 
the District Chief Executive (DCE) …‘in 2018, we are going to move to fully elected 
                                                 
24 This ambivalence was evident in the general life of local councils as the regime was compelled by international 
pressure to decentralize in return for aid (see Mohan/ Stokke 2000: 254). 
25 One should bear in mind Akkufo-Addo’s royal ties and links to chieftaincy. Indeed, among his first trips as president 
were visits to high-ranking chiefs across the country.  
26 See Baako (2013). 
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District Assembly representations including the choice of the District Chief Executive 
(DCE) …‘But between now and then, all appointments to the District Assemblies is 
going to be by close consultation between my government and you the traditional 
authorities’ (Nyabor 2016)  (italics added by author). 
That promise has to be read with care in view of previous assurances by former administrations 
to reform the composition of local councils. In other words, chiefs will continue to dictate the tone 
for local councils until the state implements such changes. 
4 The gap in local authority and revival of chieftaincy legitimacy  
Bearing in mind the caution on academic polemics between anthropologists and political 
scientists regarding marginal actors in local democracy (Neubert 2009: 43f.), the key question 
facing us is: in the absence of well-functioning institutions, what are the alternatives for delivering 
public goods? Chieftaincy is one marginal actor that fills the public authority gap. Against this 
backdrop, the relationship between chieftaincy and local councils could be analyzed in an 
impassionate way. The institution of chieftaincy has changed dramatically over time. In terms of 
background, most chiefs are relatively highly educated with public sector jobs while others live 
and work abroad, sometimes playing their role as part-time chiefs. Their associated social and 
economic statuses thrust them into positions of authority in local councils. Ideally, these changes 
in the institution of chieftaincy might imply adherence to so-called modern ideals of the nation-
state including fundamental rights of citizens and respect for rule of law. However, this does not 
always happen as some well-educated chiefs (including lawyers, judges, and university 
professors) are often ‘seduced’ by communal sentiments—against their professional ethos and 
blatantly disregard the rule of law. As I discuss below, some of these chiefs have variously issued 
ultimatum for sacking and forced removal, denied some residents their citizenship rights as well 
as issued death threats to state representatives who work in municipalities where such chiefs 
have customary legitimacy. Regarding their functions and rights in the political system, chiefs still 
control much of the land and their courts are used as local and family courts. Nonetheless, with 
their particular role as repository of culture, chiefs’ influence in development aspirations and 
design of specific projects has surged inside and outside of local councils within their customary 
jurisdiction. This is further enhanced by the ‘co-optation’ of chiefs to broker specific local political 
deals on behalf of the state (see e.g., Bogner / Neubert 2010: 54).  
4.1 Chiefs and delivery of everyday local services 
Local taxation remains an interesting topic for chiefs in the local councils. Chiefs administered 
pre-colonial taxation but their authority waned when the colonial government and their local 
councils blocked most of the financial channels open to chiefs. Local government officials managed 
revenues from land poll tax, property tax and market tolls to provide local services on behalf of 
the regime. In fact, the councils’ main functions revolved around local taxation in order to reduce 
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the financial burden on the government’s budget. To date, local taxation remains vital to the life 
of local councils to the extent that even narratives and struggles over citizenship and micro-
nationalistic overtones are very much based on ‘custodians’ of local taxation. In some sense, the 
right to collect or pay local taxes is tied to one’s origin, whether as native or settlers (Lentz 2006). 
This partly explains chiefs’ persistent intrusion in decisions of their local councils. If chiefs could 
control the making of local executive deals, their interests are secure just as the municipal council 
in Kumasi where chiefs from the Kumasi Traditional Council, KTC still hold six of the 30 percent 
appointee mandates.  
In the realization of everyday local public goods, chiefs remain the most influential. The chief of 
Kumasi, the Asantehene, enjoys a primus inter pares status with his own court and development 
apparatus (Ubink 2007: 145). This gives him so much clout to the extent that the local bureaucracy 
has to submit to his preferences. As the chair of the KTC, he was responsible for the removal of 
the mayor as mentioned earlier because he implicitly instructed his sub-chiefs, acting on his 
behalf, to reject the mayor’s apology (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: A depiction of the apology from the mayor to Kumasi Chiefs. © StarrFM Online, 9 
July 2016. 
 
Thus, although their presence in local administration is viewed as adding a ‘cultural character’ to 
local councils within their precinct, chiefs influence local administration in its quotidian sense 
even if such roles are only implicit in legislation. Everyday political programs and procedures are 
frequently subsumed under the subjective logic of neo-traditional interest and preferences. For 
most councilors, the decision to contest for municipal elections is subject to the approval of chiefs. 
One female councilor assuredly “took the kola to the chiefs” because “over here, if you want to 
contest, you have to inform the chiefs to give their assent and support your request.” (Councilor, 
Wa Municipal Assembly, 21.09.2017). This recognition is very significant because chiefs are active 
members in political mobilization for votes and going against their preferences on the council has 
political costs. Jonah (2003: 218f.) had elaborated how some Ghanaian chiefs influence how 
councilors are selected by promoting their preferred candidates to be elected unopposed via 
either persuading or discouraging others not to contest. Should council aspirants refuse to heed 
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to such advice, chiefs and their sub-chiefs would wield their influence to promote their preferred 
candidates and mobilize votes for them. Among feuding chieftaincies in a municipality, each chief 
would may present and promote several councilors on the municipal council in anticipation of 
tilting the political strength of the municipal council in their favor. Measured statements from two 
councilors were just apposite: 
when I was seeking the mandate, I first spoke to the chiefs and opinion leaders. They 
gave me support so I can’t tell whether to contest again. The electorates will also 
decide (Councilor, Wa Municipal Assembly, 18.09.2017).  
I’ll continue to serve on the council until a collective decision from the chiefs and 
opinion leaders in the area comes up that I should not go [contest] again (Councilor, 
Tamale Metropolitan Assembly, 16.09.2017).  
On their part, bureaucrats rarely go against chiefs’ interest for after all, the construction of 
physical projects such as school blocks and hospitals is possible only on parcels of land owned 
and donated by chiefs. This affects the overall attitude of officials in local councils as they give 
primacy to their chiefs. Some officials deftly mention the usurpation of powers of their legitimate 
rulers, i.e. chiefs, by the state. This behavior drastically affects the quality of municipal services 
delivered.  
Going back to accountability, one current —though overlooked —for non-executive role of chiefs 
in local politics, regards private acquisition of wealth. Aside from being perceived as 
‘anachronistic’ for modern local politics, was the additional concern that chieftaincy held features 
of corruption, a notion derived from its very composition.27 The institution of chieftaincy thrives 
on the selection of individuals based on given criteria that are not formerly fixed, and subject to 
preferences of office holders and their electors. Their subjects generally saw the ever-shifting 
allegiance over preference and perquisites of office holders as corruption even in the colonial era 
(Berry 1998: 29; Busia 1968: 172–200). When chiefs felt their position and material interests 
were threatened, they often tried to re-centralize authority (see Grischow 2008: 88f.). Such 
calculative and micro-nationalistic features still persist and underpin criticisms of chieftaincy’s 
responsiveness and accountability as advanced by sympathizers.  
4.2 Chieftain intrusions in decisions of decentralized local councils 
Neo-traditional actors do not only influence decision-making of local councils, but are equally 
vocal about central government programs for their local councils. The first of such intervention 
regards the siting of municipal capitals, the seat of the municipal government. Under both NPP 
and NDC administrations, preferences based on hierarchy of chiefs has become pronounced (Ayee 
                                                 
27 Some scholars romanticize the pre-colonial chieftaincy arrangement as democratic. However, we cannot equate a 
representative political arrangement with a body that has an elected mandate and formally fixed positions (see Sabbi 
2017: 118f.). 
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2012: 637). Ideally, the rationale for districts and their capitals is that these should be robust 
socio-economic hubs to generate own funds for local initiatives. However, chiefs make incessant 
demands on the regime to select specific geographical locations as administrative capitals without 
recourse to bureaucratic and economic viability.  
Table 2. Selected chieftain intrusive actions in municipal councils affairs (source: Author’s 
compilation based on newspaper and electronic sources. *Based on indigene-settler 
narratives) 
Date Subject Chiefs’ Action District Region State Response 
03.09.2004 Capital Recommend Adaklu Volta New municipality  
14.03.2008 Capital Reject Gomoa East Central Capital maintained 
09.06.2008 Mayor Endorse Nabdam Upper East Nominee 
confirmed 
15.04.2009 Mayor Reject Agona West Central Nominee 
withdrawn 
21.04.2009 Mayor Reject Kadjebi Volta Nominee 
confirmed 
12.07.2013 Mayor Reject* Kwabere East Ashanti Nominee rejected 
09.10.2013 Mayor Reject Dormaa East Brong Ahafo Different nominee 
25.11.2013 Mayor Reject Kadjebi Volta Nominee 
confirmed 
07.01.2016 Mayor Reinstate Ada West Gt. Accra Different nominee 
25.02.2017 Mayor Recommend Atiwa Eastern Candidate ignored 
27.04.2017 Mayor Reject Tolon Northern Nominee 
withdrawn 
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08.05.2017  Mayor Endorse Shama Western Nominee 
confirmed 
Second, they influence the selection of heads of local councils (Table 2) based on their individual 
and collective preferences. These actions from the chiefs are sometimes far-reaching, going 
beyond the struggle for local political resources, to broader definitions of who can access those 
resources. Chiefs often endorse or reject nominees for the councils based on some micro-
nationalistic descriptions and vague definitions of citizenship using ‘settler-indigene’ narratives. 
Cases from two municipal councils help us to clearly illustrate this point: 
[the councilors] were uncomfortable whether to endorse the President’s nominee or 
not as some chiefs in the area, had expressed their disappointment with the President 
for nominating a non-indigene as political head of the [municipality] … A section of the 
chiefs in the area even petitioned the late President to consider revoking the 
nomination … in favour of an indigene who can better address their concerns, rather 
than a settler (Anane 2013) (italics added by author). 
And in 2009 following the Ghanaian President’s nomination of a candidate, who was born, has 
lived, and worked in a municipality, to assume local executive power, the vitriolic settler-indigene 
narrative assumed even greater impetus.28 The confirmation vote had to enter a second and final 
phase after the chiefs asked ‘native’ councilors to reject the nominee or face their threats of 
anarchy and bloodshed. Upon confirmation of the nominee by the council, some instances of 
violence occurred but the chiefs were somewhat [and unwillingly after the elite body of chiefs 
intervened] compelled to recognize the state and its representative. As captured by local reporter:  
the omanhene [paramount chief] of Atebubu, Nana Owusu Akyeaw Brempong II has 
formally recognised Mr. Sanja Nanja, the Atebubu-Amantin District Chief Executive 
(DCE). The news of the acceptance and recognition of Mr. Sanja as the DCE of the area 
by Nana Brempong and his elder last Monday afternoon spread like wildfire […] [the 
chief] together with his elders about a year ago, kicked against the nomination of Mr. 
Nanja as the DCE for Atebubu-Amantin […] that he was not an indigene or native of 
the area […] Mr. Nanja, was born and bred in Atebubu and until his appointment as 
DCE, was a teacher in the district (Doudu 2010).  
The nominee politically advanced when elected as parliamentarian of that constituency, thanks to 
support from migrants and settlers in the area. But these people with ‘settler roots’ were the 
subject of persistent verbal and violent attacks by so-called indigenes. In a contest of widening 
inequality and access to societal resources, the ‘settler-indigene’ narratives and tensions have 
broader implications for personal belongings, businesses and material acquisitions of ‘settlers’. 
Land and other properties (e.g. cash crops, houses, and businesses) of both politically-active and 
                                                 
28 For a detailed discussion on this topic, see Lobnibe (2017). 
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a-political individuals with migrant background have at times become the focus of attention, 
seizure, destruction, eviction and banishment by so-called indigenes, with the support and 
connivance of indigene municipal officials (Boone / Duku 2012: 679–681; Valsecchi 2008:152–
155).  
Startlingly, some elected officials also confront these narratives on a daily basis. A female 
councilor was bitter that female electorates in her ward were the “worst offenders” to remind her 
of being “a stranger but behaves as if she is an indigene to dictate to them in the community” 
(Councilor, Nkwanta South District Assembly, 12.10.2017). The chiefs’ action reflects ‘elites’ 
anxiety’ that patronage benefits would not trickle down to them given their preferred candidates 
have not been selected. In some cases, the regime was cowered into accepting such demands from 
chiefs. Where that is not possible, they were compensated with other development projects in 
their respective communities. We may infer that in spite of the changes in the make-up of 
chieftaincy, that emergent idea of ‘modernizing’ chieftaincy has hardly changed ethno-political 
sentiments, persuasions, and mobilization. The ‘indigene-settler’ narratives and persuasion are 
more pronounced in geo-political areas with feuding chieftaincies. In such councils, development 
projects are often assigned to specific localities based on calculations of which chiefs favor the 
incumbent administration. One councilor lamented that:  
the chieftaincy rift has entered the council such that if you come from [this place] you 
are always seen as an opponent. For all three councilors from [this place], it is very 
difficult for us to ask for a development project and succeed… Although I have the 
same party affiliation as the council leaders, they have stopped inviting me to 
meetings. They believe that I might leak information to my chiefs (Councilor, Jaman 
South District Assembly, 27.08.2017).29 
These chieftaincy rifts not only bring division but also cripple the everyday function of the already 
fraught local councils. The case of a sub-council in the Wa Municipality illustrates how  
existing chieftaincy and land disputes permeate the work of the council such that 
residents of one of the feuding wards refused to pay their tolls and taxes to a council 
that is located in ‘enemy’ electoral ward (Councilor, Wa Municipal Assembly, 
19.09.2017).  
Consequently, their respective councilors appeared helpless as the council could hardly convene 
to implement development and taxation programs. These rifts also stoke up ethnic sentiments in 
local councils with multi-ethnic composition and competing chieftaincy claims.30 
                                                 
29 The council was elevated to municipal status in March 2018, there was agitation from one chieftaincy faction for the 
area represented by this councilor to be named the ‘authentic’ municipal capital. By 15 October 2018, this underlying 
tension together with other land disputes had escalated into a full-blown conflict.  
30 In September 2018, similar observations were made in an adjourning council, the Wa East District, which has three 
dominant ethnic groups: Sissala, Waala, and the Chakali. Comments by councilors revealed inherent animosity by some 
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Beyond their influence in the selection of leaders for local councils, chiefs would cajole or even 
insist that council representatives ‘listen’ to them and ‘do’ their wishes. Any attempt to thwart 
such demands is labelled as ‘disobedience’ or ‘disrespectful’ and attracts the chiefs’ wrath. Indeed, 
the removal of the mayor of Kumasi in 2016 was based on the mayor’s attempt to curb chiefs’ 
influence and interest in the realization of development projects. As one report pointed out: 
the mayor of the KMA had to finally succumb to the immense pressure by the Kumasi 
Traditional Council (KTC) as he tendered in his resignation letter … His resignation 
was triggered by enormous pressure by the Kumasi chiefs, who had done everything 
possible, including a ritual sacrifice of sheep, to see [the mayor] whom they accused 
of gross insubordination – out of office. The chiefs, at a crunch meeting … preferred 
six charges against Mr. Kojo Bonsu [the mayor], with the main charge being that he 
had continually displayed acts of disrespect towards the chiefs (Awuah 2016). 
The mayor fell out of favor for questioning extortions by one chief from the KTC who served on a 
municipal committee for market renovation (Freiku / Alhassan 2016). Implicit in the chiefs’ 
reaction is the belief that they own the councils. Reacting to a resettlement impasse between 
marketeers and the municipal council, one lead chief was unambiguous that “Kumasi belongs to 
the [Asantehene] and now the government has brought the council but the city’s ‘owner’ cannot 
be ignored.” (Manwerehene Baffour Brentuo Hyiaman, Kumasi, 01.11.2017). Impliedly, chiefs 
should not only be accommodated on municipal councils but councilors must also learn to 
succumb to chiefs’ preferences. Additionally, chiefs sometimes create parallel institutions in the 
communities where they exercise chieftaincy responsibilities: 
I have five elected unit committee members for the electoral area but they do not get 
any incentive, therefore, they are dormant. The chiefs are also a hindrance to all this; 
when I assumed office, I took them [unit committee members] to the chiefs but they 
said they [also] have their own Committee Members. What I had to do was to ask them 
to bring their committee workers to join the [elected] unit committee members so 
they could work together … because of that, the unit committee is not active 
(Councilor, Kumasi, 02.08.2013). 
The chiefs’ behavior suggests a clash of local institutions with competing claims to authority and 
the legitimate trustees of communities in the electoral wards. It is of course not problematic if 
chiefs use their clout to support local initiative via development committees. However, for most 
councilors, it is inconceivable that initiatives by neo-traditional authority would antagonize the 
task of representatives who hold elected mandate. That does not only complicate but also 
demotivate them from serving the common good. It is even more problematic when, in a 
decentralized political system, positions are defined on micro-nationalistic markers of indigene 
versus settler. While this makes nonsense of the local political project, the very design of the 
                                                 
Waala councilors towards the sitting of the capital at Funsi. Some Sissala and Chakali councilors on their part felt Waala 
councilors and bureaucrats were intentionally undermining the functioning of the local council. 
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structure that allows for unelected positions on the councils enhances the practice even more. It 
appears chiefs are still wailing from the loss of much of their influence in local councils.  
4.3 Chiefs and practical delivery of local services: the ‘new’ brokers of development deals 
Chiefs’ role in communal politics should not be narrowly interpreted as always obstructive to the 
task of local councils. In fact, there are several instances when chiefs and their associates lead local 
development initiatives, shaming the councils to work. When chiefs, especially appointee 
‘developmental chiefs’, put up projects such as libraries, primary schools, hospitals and police 
cells, etc. that the state has been unable to provide, they do not only challenge but also humiliate 
the state to come to terms with its claim of unrivalled authority and depth over its territory. The 
point raised by a bureaucrat on the quotidian realization of local projects is illustrative: 
We told the mayor that we need one building for a clinic and they used their [District 
Assembly] Common Fund to support it. They built a clinic at Breman [in Kumasi] and 
the chiefs and opinion leaders are interested in its operation. Sometimes they do 
communal labor, sometimes they provide chairs for visiting nurses during 
immunization. So the chiefs are playing a role like other stakeholders (Senior Health 
Administrator, Kumasi, 14.06.2016). 
With their revered status as development brokers, chiefs would appoint in their community, 
honorary chiefship or so-called development chiefs, Nkosuohene.31 These may be outstanding 
expatriates who come with foreign currency and donations. Appointee chiefs contribute variously 
to the provision of basic amenities and events for the local councils. They set up NGOs, build 
libraries and schools, and set up scholarship schemes (Bob-Miller 2009: 543–546; Knierzinger 
2011: 24ff.; McCaskie 2009: 53ff.). However, some successful local businessmen and professionals 
are also awarded such positions. Chiefs enjoy preeminence in the social capital argument, which 
sees them as critical trustees for local social transformation (Grischow 2008: 87). Leading local 
self-initiative such as the numerous education funds, chiefs enjoy praise for their evident 
brokerage potential. The Asantehene’s Education Fund, for example, has attracted support from 
local and international donors. Despite the management challenges of this project, the initiative 
has been emulated in other traditional authorities (Otumfuo 2009). Critics point out problems of 
accountability when unscrupulous individuals appropriate project resources to themselves and 
their cronies (see Bob-Miller 2009: 553ff.; The Chronicle 26 June 2004). The consensus, however, 
is that these initiatives foster development that may otherwise not happen.  
Neo-traditional festivals and durbars of specific traditional councils are occasions not only to 
celebrate their achievements but also for fundraising. They offer the platform for local people to 
push the state to make promises that are very often unfulfilled. At the same time, numerous expats 
and international actors that are invited to these occasions come with much needed foreign 
                                                 
31 Most pre-colonial polities had youth groups with their leaders so-called mmrantehene, who led communal policing 
and provided public services. These groups became less prominent after independence (see Manoukian 1964). 
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currency, donations and networks. Significantly, affluent citizens living abroad (e.g., development 
chiefs) who are able to galvanize development assistance would use festivals as the occasion to 
glory and shame the state for its service as well its neglect of public service delivery. The case of 
Cephas Bansah, a development chief, and the German association Gemeinde Heiligkreuzsteinach in 
Heidelberg clearly illustrates the public humiliation of the state at both the local and national 
levels. At a durbar to publicize a jointly-constructed female jail for the municipality of Hohoe in 
Eastern Ghana, the chief and his sponsors went on to attack the state for paying lip services of 
maintaining law and order while neglecting human rights claims and entitlements of inmates. 
Though a police station is supposed to be the safest place, female detainees were subjected to 
sexual offences under the watch of police officers.32 This neglect by the state gave impetus for the 
chiefs, as the real representatives of their communities, to globetrot for funds to build the separate 
female jail and present at a grand durbar with state officials unabashedly in attendance.  
Most important for chiefs, these durbars and festivals are used to coax international development 
actors to continue to repose a belief in them as community trustees; as real representatives of 
local people and their development (see Grischow 2008: 83).33 Through this, they claim a direct 
representation of their people, something state and its local representatives lack or willingly 
ignore. Therefore, chiefs successfully glory in their efforts to secure development interventions 
where the state fails. In effect, these initiatives fill a void in municipalities where the state is largely 
absent. At such durbars, chiefs would symbolically summon state authorities to ‘submit’ and 
legitimize traditional authority as seen in Figure 3, where chiefs sit while state elite and politicians 
stand up to greet the chiefs.34 And to illustrate the point when well-educated chiefs become 
‘seduced’ by communal sentiments, the same paramount chief (seated in state in figure 3) had in 
2014 threatened the immediate removal of a local hospital administrator or the chief and his 
elders would not to be responsible for any mishap to that administrator (see Bokpe 2014).  
                                                 
32 See Besonderes Präsent: DAS schenkte afrikanischer König seinem Volk (Rothfels 2018). 
33 The Asantehene in 2004 used his personal networks within the World Bank to secure a 30 million USD grant for 
traditional authorities to support water and sanitation projects (Valsecchi 2008: 146). 
34 Note that as a symbol of authority and sign of respect, chiefs sit in state and the president rather stands up and greets 
them in turns 
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Figure 3 A Ghanaian President honouring Chiefs at a traditional festival. © John Mahama, 
20.12.2014.  
 
Co-production of local authority is vividly observed in communal surveillance and security 
projects. In local councils, one observes that chiefs play leading roles in voluntary self-organizing 
to provide communal self-defence and security in responds to rising levels of crime. 
Neighborhood self-organized security arrangements bring safety by fighting criminal activities. 
But to gain the necessarily trust in such voluntary arrangements, one must rely on inter-personal 
relations where chiefs and their traditional councils are frontrunners in selecting young men to 
help fight crime. The local state mainly provides formal recognition and some remuneration to 
such arrangements. Thus, despite the challenges posed by their interest and intervention, chiefs 
remain invaluable to the success of development projects in their councils. I must however point 
out the ambivalence inherent in this peculiar position of chiefs in relation to the functions of 
municipal councils. Certainly, their gesture points directly at the role of the “good paternalist 
patriarch”35 someone who openly supports a local council chosen, to a large extent, in a 
democratic election. But their action on another level should be understood if we analyze the 
structure of the chieftaincy institution, its accountability and the political control it offers citizens. 
The critical question that we may ask is: what happens when the chief is not the good patriarch? 
                                                 
35 This concept is understood to denote a person in position of authority who can once be very generous and supportive 
but also ruthless based on specific circumstance and interests. 
28  University of Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers 22 
This question becomes more apparent when we consider the role of chiefs as custodians of land 
particularly in Ghana. Customary land ownership, so-called ‘stool land’, accounts for over 80% of 
landholding in Ghana and inhibits the state’s ability to implement land reforms (see Narh et al. 
2016). Therefore, most municipal governments depend on allocations made by chiefs and royal 
houses. Since land remains central to the chieftaincy institutions, land ownership and access to 
land constitute a potential area of conflict not only among feuding chieftaincies but also between 
neo-traditional actors and municipalities where tensions arise between government rights and 
chiefly claims.  
5 Conclusion: local council as arena for preserving chieftain interest 
The discussion on ambivalence on the part of state actors and their local political programs help 
us to broach the topic of the persistence of neo-traditional interests in local councils. That 
chieftaincy is a ‘necessary’ institution for any political arrangement in post-colonial Ghana 
(Valsecchi 2008) appears taken-for-granted by actors both inside and outside of state 
bureaucracy. This persistence thrives on the ambivalence with which such actors approach the 
difficult topic of modern local administration that must at once be a merit-based democratic 
structure and still legitimized by neo-traditional norms. Most people embrace popular democracy 
in local councils but will at once posit that the office of chiefs predate the councils. The only 
difference in opinion is how specifically chiefs should be engaged in the local democracy project.  
In addition, political elites and bureaucrats do not doubt the relevance of chieftaincy in matters of 
local administration. They would quickly point out chiefs as key people to consult in local decision 
making sometimes without recourse to whether or not it is officially permissible. Thus, the 
ambivalence with chieftaincy emanates from the fact that it provides legitimacy to state actors 
while at once distorting that legitimacy in its quotidian sense. As noted, the different 
administrations made frenetic and varying efforts to reform local councils, including the role of 
chiefs. However, the more state actors found their own legitimacy questioned, the more 
ambiguous their political programs proceeded. That in effect rendered ambivalent their intent to 
rid the chiefs of influence in local councils. Since these attempts have been subjected to selective 
preferences of state officials, they have deepened the ambiguity even further. Now, it appears 
clear that for local councils and their projects to be meaningful, there is the need to strike a 
delicate compromise between neo-traditional institutions and their state counterparts. As such, 
persistent rhetoric and evaluations of local councils, following the typical Weberian model that 
excludes chiefs’ influence are just as ambiguous as the legitimacy they engender.  
Local political reforms via legislation, overt rhetoric and political programs against so-called 
‘meddling’ of chiefs in local councils have primarily been contingent on legitimacy – some sought 
loyal local chiefs and defended their own royal ties. While the colonial strategy was viewed with 
disdain, tactics of post-colonial administrations have been nothing more than enhancing regime 
legitimacy. Thus, a ‘genuine’ attempt to strengthen the local political system and define clearly the 
role of chiefs in the councils is still missing. In particular, the different administrations cautious of 
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their own survival have approached the role of chiefs in the councils with varying degrees of 
ambiguity. This ambivalence has, in effect, enhanced the resolve of chiefs in the daily running of 
local councils. Thus, reformists who see local institutional changes as a quick fix to mark the end 
of chieftain interest in municipal councils would be disappointed. Their concerted efforts appear 
rather to enhance such interest. Yet, considering the everyday relevance of chiefs in those 
councils, the counterfactual question of whether the formal inclusion or exclusion of chiefs will 
change Ghanaian municipalities’ delivery of local services, still remains. A clear formal 
arrangement that clarifies the relationship between both institutions of chieftaincy and local 
councils in case of conflict will, which is still missing, might be of considerable importance to 
reformers. One could perhaps argue that Sierra Leone has been smart in assigning formal and 
executive roles to chiefs in their local councils where chiefs chair local development committees. 
Despite some inherent tussles with elected councilors, this bold public policy has nonetheless 
removed any ambiguity regarding the wielders of executive power within the electoral wards 
(Edwards et al. 2015: 50). 
For the everyday practical arrangements, the role of chiefs on the councils should be clearly 
delineated such that a distinction is made between everyday running of the councils and when 
chiefs could be consulted or intervene in decisions of the councils. Alternatively, chiefs should be 
allowed to contest and represent unique wards on the councils. With elected mandate, their 
ambiguous roles may disappear. Additionally, a reduction in central governments influence in 
local councils will be helpful. If, for instance, the heads of local councils are elected instead of 
central government appointment, that mandate could help offset the pressures for their removal 
by chiefs. Indeed, any calls for such removal might invoke legislative provisions and perhaps a call 
for early elections. This might not only appear tedious but most likely lead chiefs to soften their 
stance on personality preferences. Further, election of mayors and heads of municipalities will 
help forestall attempts by chiefs to massage micro-nationalistic narratives for headship of local 
councils – preferring an indigene to other candidates who have different ethnic inclinations. Of 
course, the changes suggested above do not hold the ‘magic bullet’ against the challenges of local 
councils especially as the current government seeks even closer integration of chiefs in municipal 
councils. One could point to the Akufo-Addo administration’s local political program of regional 
realignment that was mooted only after meeting with chiefs from those regions. In spite of the 
current local democracy project, that famous statement by a chief, quoted in the introductory 
statement (Dunn / Robertson 1973: 294), still applies. For chiefs, the local councils constitute a 
local political privilege and it would appear that chiefs would run the show in local councils for 
the foreseeable future!  
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Figure 4 Collage: Ghanaian chiefs arriving at municipal council events © Author  
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